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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
language."0 Foster, on the other hand, has rendered section 103 a
mere redundancy.
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Taxation-Gross Estate-Accident Insurance as Life Insurance
For federal estate tax purposes, a decedent's gross estate includes
the proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life, regardless of the
identity of the beneficiary, if the decedent at his death possessed
any of the incidents of ownership in the policy.' In Commissioner
v. Estate of Noel,2 decedent, just prior to a fatal plane crash, ac-
quired two flight insurance policies which were paid for by his wife.
The terms of the policies provided that the beneficiary could be
changed and the policies assigned by written endorsement -of -the
insured. However, having designated his wife as beneficiary, de-
cedent merely handed her the policies. His executor subsequently
excluded the flight insurance proceeds from the gross estate. The
Commissioner determined a deficiency under section 2042(2) and
was sustained in this by the Tax Court.' The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed,4 distinguishing flight insurance as acci-
dent insurance against a risk rather than insurance against an in-
evitable event which is within the purview of this section.5 Reject-
ing the appellate court's rationale, the Supreme Court held that
0 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955). In a proceeding
on petition for naturalization, the court said:
The Government's contention that § 405 (a) does not apply to any
phase in the processing of naturalization petitions would defeat and
destroy the plain meaning of that section. "The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy!'. . . It is our duty
"to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute," Mont-
clair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an
entire section ....
Id. at 538-39. (Emphasis added.)
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 provides in part:
§ 2042. PRocEEDs OF LIFE INSURANcE. The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property-
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER B3ENEFICIARIES. To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the
life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person....2380 U.S. 678 (1965).
' Estate of Marshall L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962).




section 2042(2) applies to any type of accidental death insurance
on the life of the decedente and includes such proceeds if the de-
cedent at his death possessed any of the incidents of ownership in
the policy notwithstanding the factual impossibility of his exercising
these rights.7 Thus, the Noel case represents an encompassing appli-
cation of section 2042(2) to all types of insurance policies on the
decedent's life even though such proceeds might be included under
some other section of the Code.8
Entitled "Life Insurance," section 2042(2) applies to "policies
on the life of the decedent"9 which "are designed to shift to a
group of individuals the risk of premature death."'" The distinction
between death proceeds from life insurance and accident insurance
has been purely academic for estate tax purposes" since a 1929
Board of Tax Appeals interpretation:
It is well recognized that there is a distinction between life in-
surance and accident insurance, the former insuring . . . against
death in any event and the latter against death under certain
contingencies, but we fail to see why one is not taken out upon
the life of the policy holder as much as the other. In each case
the risk assumed by the insurer is the loss of the insured's life,
and the payment of the insurance money is contingent upon the
loss of life .... The provisions of Section [2042(2)] are broad
enough to include both classes of insurance .... 12
Thus, relying on congressional, administrative, and judicial ac-
quiescence in this general construction,'" the Court applied section
2042(2). They intimated that the type of insurance policy is im-
material so long as it is "on the life of the decedent."' 4 But, should
not the type of policy make a difference?
8 380 U.S. at 682.
7 Id. at 684.
8 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 286-87
(2d ed. 1962); 2 MER~a"rs, LAW o FFEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION
42-55 (1959).
o See note 1 supra.
1 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540 (1941).
11The technical distinction is that under an accident insurance policy
the insured contingency is an accident resulting in death to the insured,
whereas under a life insurance policy it is death by whatever cause. For
discussion of the inadequacy of this distinction under the estate tax, see
Johnston, Flight Insurance and Federal Taxation: A Critical Examination
of The Noel Case, 1965 DUKE L.J. 32.
" Leopold Ackerman, 15 B.T.A. 635, 637-38 (1929).
13380 U.S. at 681-82. See Johnston, supra note 11.
" The Treasury Regulations provide that "the term 'insurance' refers
to life insurance of every description, including death benefits paid by fra-
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Enacted to prevent estate tax avoidance in transmitting property
at death,' 5 section 2042(2) should apply to those types of insurance
policies which would be purchased for that purpose, namely, the
carefully selected life insurance policies and accident insurance
policies with death benefits which protect the insured and his family
during most of his life. However, trip-by-trip insurance policies
with death benefits, hastily purchased from any seller, do not ac-
complish this long-range scheme of protection."0 Rather they ap-
pear to be a one-shot gamble. But this type of policy does supple-
ment the over-all plan of insurance protection to pass on at death
a wealth to a recipient of the insured's selection and thereby falls
squarely within the ambit of section 2042(2) if the decedent in-
sured possessed at death any of the incidents of ownership in the
policy.
Where he possesses at death the right (1) to change the bene-
ficiary,17 (2) to assign the policy, or to revoke an assignment,' 8
(3) to surrender the policy and receive the cash value, 9 (4) to
borrow on the policy,20 (5) to cancel the policy,2' or (6) to receive
distribution in case of disability,2 or where the decedent possesses at
death (7) a possibility of reverter in the policy exceeding five
per cent in value, 3 or (8) other economic benefits in the pol-
ternal beneficial societies operating under the lodge system." Treas. Reg. §
20.2042-1(a) (1) (1958). For examples of "life insurance," see generally
LOwNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 288-91; 2 MERTENS, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 334-40.
" See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918); S. REP. No.
617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 42 (1918).
1" However, those who travel extensively often purchase travel insurance
to cover a specified period.1, Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
1 Caldwell v. Jordan, 119 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
10 Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
20 Ibid.
11 Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd sub no., Selz-
nick's Estate v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952).
" Old Point Nat'l Bank, 39 B.T.A. 343 (1939).
" Hock v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1945). The INT. REv.
CODE or 1954, § 2042(2) provides:
[T]he term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest
_(whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument
or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the
death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary
interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the
policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to
a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at
any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's
[Vol. 44
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icy,24 the decedent insured has sufficient incidents of ownership in the
policy to include the proceeds under section 2042 (2).25 The Court
interpreted the Code as not imposing a dual requirement of posses-
sion plus exercisability" and held that the decedent had met this
requirement, even though as a practical matter he could not have
changed the beneficiary or assigned the policy en route. If the view
were taken that inability to exercise these rights negates possession
of an incident of ownership, very few insurance proceeds would be
included in a decedent's gross estate, since this situation almost
always prevails moments before death. Thus, mere legal posses-
sion at death of any of these incidents of ownership is enough for
inclusion under the insurance section. Moreover, such possession
by a decedent could warrant including the proceeds or some part
thereof under some other section or sections of the Code, notwith-
standing the application of section 2042(2).
The value of the incident of ownership possessed at death by
the decedent insured could be included under section 2033.2" While
death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of
mortality and actuarial principles ....
2" The Treasury Regulations state that "the term 'incidents of owner-
ship' is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical
legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the
insured ... to the economic benefits of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-
1(c) (2) (1958).
2" For illustrations of nonincidents of ownership, see generally 2 MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 368-70.
" Even though the Code refers to incidents of ownership possessed by
the decedent, "exercisable either alone or in conjunction with another
person," the courts have held this clause not to require more than legal
exercisability. See Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963).
27 Most insurance policies require an endorsement of the policy to exercise
the incidents of ownership. Unless the decedent insured carried the policy
in his pocket, he could not exercise his rights at death regardless of his
whereabouts. But, could it be argued that this factual question is one which
should be submitted to a jury? Cf. Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 226
F. Supp. 623 (1963) (whether a woman is capable of having children is now
a question for the jury). If such were allowed, the federal district courts
would be swamped with cases involving this one question since the Tax
Court does not have a jury. Moreover, the jury might be prejudiced against
the government when, e.g., a little old lady was too feeble to understand
that complicated insurance policy. Thus, the key to inclusion is possession
alone.
8 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033 provides that "the value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property ... to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death." Only the value of the
decedent's interest is included. Thus, where the only incident of ownership
possessed by the decedent was a reversionary interest exceeding five per
cent in value of the policy, the amount included in his gross estate is the
value of such reversionary interest and not the entire proceeds.
1965]
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the Treasury Regulations and the legislative history of section
2033 express such a possibility," the courts have refused to apply
this generic section to insurance on the life of the decedent by reason-
ing that the more specific provision, section 2042(2), preempts in-
clusion under section 2033.30 However, they have freely utilized
other specific sections to include such proceeds.31
Applying to inter vivos transfers where a grantor retains the
power to affect beneficial interests, sections 2036(a)(2)32 and
203833 would include the proceeds where a decedent transferred an
insurance policy but retained and possessed at death such rights as
the power to change the beneficiary, the power to assign the policy,
or other incidents of ownership. 34 Furthermore, section 2037"5
applies to insurance proceeds where there was an inter vivos transfer
by a decedent insured if beneficial enjoyment of the policy were
solely dependent upon surviving the decedent who possessed at
death a reversionary interest exceeding five per cent in value of the
"O Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2) (1958); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 236 (1942).
"See Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Proutt's
Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1942).
" See, e.g., Estate of Ruth Brainard Cutler, 13 T.C. 138 (1949) (trans-
fer taking effect at death).
" (a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer ... by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death-
"(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
" INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 provides in part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the
exercise of a power . . . by the decedent alone or by the decedent in
conjunction with any other person . . . to alter, amend, revoke, or ter-
minate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of
decedent's death....
" Estate of Mabel E. Morton, 12 T.C. 380 (1949). However, once the
court has found § 2042 applicable, they deem it unnecessary to consider §§
2036 (a) (2) and 2038. See Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950),
aff'd sub nom., Selznick's Estate v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
'5INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2037.
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policy. 6 Usage of these inter vivos transfer sections would be
decisive for the government if the application of section 2042(2)
were dubious.3 7 However, the Noel case enlarges the scope of this
section to include the insurance proceeds of any type of policy "on
the life of the decedent" if he possesses at death incidents of owner-
ship. Thus, the possession at death of these incidents of ownership
is required for inclusion under both the insurance section and the
inter vivos transfer sections.
To avoid the inclusion of proceeds from insurance on his life,
an insured must irrevocably designate a beneficiary other than his
estate and completely divest himself of all other incidents of owner-
ship in the policy. Moreover, unless actuated by "living motives,""8
this divestiture must occur more than three years before the de-
cedent's death to escape inclusion under section 203539 as a transfer
in contemplation of death.' With this three-year limitation, how-
ever, a decedent insured can still avoid the inclusion of trip insurance
proceeds by having the transferee pay the premiums on the policy."
Thus, the key to exclusion is prudent planning.
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
o Estate of Ruth Brainard Cutler, 13 T.C. 138 (1949). For evaluation
of the reversionary interest, see Treas. Reg. 20.2037-1(c) (3) (1958).
"' See, e.g., Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945); Com-
missioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941).
88 See, e.g., Des Portes v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C.
1959) (transfer to his wife to make her more financially independent);
Estate of Verne C. Hunt, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950) (transfer to wife to avoid
judgment creditors).
" INT. Rnv. ColE oF 1954, § 2035 states that "if the decedent within a
period of 3 years ending with his death . .. transferred an interest in
property . . . such transfer . .. unless shown to the contrary," shall be
included in the decedent's gross estate.
"0 Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950). Even
after complete divestiture, where a decedent insured continued to pay the
premiums on the policy, that part of the insurance proceeds proportionate to
the premiums paid within this three-year period will be included in his
gross estate. See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
However, this situation can be avoided by creating a funded insurance trust
more than 3 years before his death. See LowNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 147-48.
,' See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945), where the
court held that the proportionate part of the insurance policy purchased by
the transferee should be excluded from the decedent's gross estate.
1965]
